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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL J. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020341-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 & 
Supp. 2002), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp. 
2002). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996 & Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where a barefoot defendant frightened police and the apartment tenant by 
suddenly bolting from a closet in a dark bedroom, did police exceed the scope of an 
otherwise justified Terry frisk by checking the discarded jacket and shoes at defendant's 
feet for weapons?1 
'See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free-zone, 
a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) 
(1998 & Supp. 2002), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free-zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5, and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 
& Supp. 2002). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a 
warrantless search (R30-23).2 Following an evidentiary hearing on 24 January 2002, the 
trial court orally denied the motion (R210:47-52) (a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is 
attached). 
Thereafter, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted for the lesser-included 
offense of possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R129). He was 
convicted as charged for possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free-zone, a class A 
misdemeanor (id.). The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of 0-5 years for the 
felony offense and a concurrent indeterminate term of 1 year for the misdemeanor offense 
(R194-1933). 
2The record is numbered in reverse chronological order.. 
2 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R198). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
Police were performing a consensual welfare check on Dawn Webster's children 
when a lightly dressed and barefoot defendant suddenly emerged from a closet in a dark 
bedroom, startling both Dawn and police. Defendant was immediately handcuffed and 
frisked for weapons, revealing paraphernalia and drugs in the discarded jacket and shoes 
at his feet. 
On 28 December 2001, Officer Billings of the Provo City Police Department 
received an anonymous report that methamphetamine was being used by injection in front 
of small children at Dawn's apartment, located at 974 West 600 South, #7B (R205:6; 
R210:4; R212:105). Officer Billings and three other officers went to the apartment to 
perform a "welfare check" (R205:6-7; R210:4) (R212:105). When Officer Billings 
knocked on the door, Dawn's approximately 50-year old mother answered (R205:18; 
R212:108). Dawn came to the door shortly thereafter (R205:7-8; R212:108). She 
consented to let the officers enter and search her apartment and belongings (R205:7-8; 
R210:4; R212:108). Officer Billings followed Dawn to the main bedroom, approximately 
25 feet from the front door (R205: R210:5; R212:109). 
3The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 
1997). The trial court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript {see R210:4), in 
addition to evidence adduced at the suppression hearing; therefore, the State has included 
citations to the preliminary hearing transcript {see R205), along with citations to the 
suppression hearing {see R210), and trial {see R212) transcripts, in support of the trial 
court's ruling. 
3 
The bedroom was unusually dark because the shades were drawn and the window-
was also draped with a blanket (R210:9; R212:l 10, 137). Dawn stepped into the room 
and picked up her baby from the crib—Officer Billings followed (R210:6; R212:109, 
134). Dawn and Officer Billings were in the bedroom for approximately 3-5 seconds 
when defendant unexpectedly emerged from the closet, startling both Dawn and the 
officer (R205:7-8, 27-28; R210:6, 9). Dawn "screamed out [sic] [her] mom and asked 
what her boyfriend was [doing] in [her] room"-Dawn had thought that defendant was in 
the kitchen with her mother (R205.33). 
Although the closet doors were open, Officer Billings had not previously observed 
defendant inside (R210:6; R212:109). Defendant's rapid approach toward him concerned 
Officer Billings and he reached for his sidearm (R210:9). Officer Billings also stepped 
back and ordered defendant to stop, turn around and place his hands where the officer 
could see them (R210:10). He then handcuffed defendant and patted him down for 
weapons (R210:10; R212:138). Finding no weapons on defendant's person, Officer 
Billings had another officer escort the barefooted and lightly dressed defendant to the 
front porch for safety purposes (R210:11,14-16; R212:111). 
Because it was "extremely cold" outside, Officer Billings asked an approximately 
7-year-old child in the room if the coat defendant had been standing on belonged to him 
(defendant) (R210:11, 13,15; R212:lll-112,138-139). The child responded 
affirmatively (R210.il). When asked, Dawn also indicated that the coat belonged to 
defendant—he had been wearing it "when [she] answered the door" (R205:34). When 
4 
Officer Billings picked up the coat to take it to defendant, he patted the pockets for safety 
purposes: "I'm not going to hand a coat with a loaded gun to somebody in handcuffs" 
(R205:23). The officer's frisk of defendant's coat was essentially instantaneous with the 
preceding frisk of defendant's person—separated by less than 60 seconds (R212:13). 
In patting down the coat, Officer Billings "felt something in the pocket... [that] 
[f]elt like a syringe" (R212:l 1). Officer Billings "[has] had hundreds of situations where 
[he has] dealt with syringes in the line of duty" (id.). "For the short time that [he] touched 
it, [he] could feel the top of the needle where the T part is . . . [he] could feel that there 
was a cap over the needle section," and was "confident" that the object was a syringe 
(R212:12). Officer Billings took the syringe into his custody "so that it [could not] be 
used, destroyed, or used as a weapon against any officers that were there"(R205:20). A 
brown liquid in the syringe was later tested and found to be methamphetamine 
(R212:153, 155). 
Shortly after Officer Billings found the syringe, Officer Woodall retrieved 
defendant's shoes from beside the bed, not more than three feet from the closet (R205:21; 
R212:111, 166). In doing so, Officer Woodall saw a baggy filled with syringes inside one 
of the shoes (R212:l 19-20,167-168). 
Once the syringes were removed from defendant's coat and shoes, Officer Billings 
took these items to defendant on the front porch and placed him under arrest (R205:24; 
R210:21). 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not contest that police reasonably suspected he was potentially 
dangerous and thus properly frisked him for weapons; the only issue here is whether the 
weapons frisk properly included his nearby jacket and shoes. Because the frisk of 
defendant's person and that of his jacket and shoes were separated by less than 60 
seconds, and because defendant had been standing on or near these items before bolting 
from the closet, the trial court found that the checks of defendant's clothing were properly 
part of the weapons frisk of his person. This sound ruling is well supported and should be 
upheld. Other courts to consider the issue, including the United States Supreme Court, 
have similarly rejected defendants' claims that a Terry weapons frisk is limited to a 
suspects worn outer-clothing. Moreover, given that defendant would inevitably be 
provided his coat and shoes regardless of whether he was ultimately released or arrested, 
police prudently first checked them for weapons. 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE A BAREFOOT AND LIGHTLY DRESSED DEFENDANT 
FRIGHTENED BOTH POLICE AND THE APARTMENT TENANT 
BY SUDDENLY BOLTING FROM A CLOSET IN A DARK 
BEDROOM, POLICE DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF AN 
OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED TERRY FRISK BY CHECKING THE 
DISCARDED JACKET AND SHOES AT HIS FEET FOR WEAPONS 
Defendant concedes that police reasonably suspected that he was armed and 
dangerous and therefore "that the frisk of his person was justified given the totality of the 
circumstances as listed by the trial court: darkened room, presence of child, investigation 
of potential drug use, surprise, quick exit from the closet and approach towards officer." 
Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant similarly raises no objection to his removal outside the 
apartment to the front porch for the duration of the consensual search. Aplt. Br. at 6-10. 
Nor does defendant dispute that having patted-down what he believed to be a syringe, 
Officer Billings was justified in retrieving the syringe from defendant's jacket. Id. 
Defendant's only complaint here is the scope of the weapons frisk itself, i.e., whether it 
properly included the discarded coat and shoes at his feet. Aplt. Br. at 9. The trial court's 
ruling, that the scope of the weapons frisk was reasonable and proper {see R210:52), is 
well-supported and should be upheld. 
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a 
citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). "For 'what the Constitution forbids is not 
all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (I960)). 
A dual inquiry applies in evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry detention. The 
first question is "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception,"and the second 
is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Accord State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). Because defendant does not dispute that the frisk of his 
person was justified {see Aplt. Br. at 9), the focus here is on the second inquiry: whether 
police exceeded the scope of an otherwise permissible Terry frisk when they checked the 
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coat and shoes at his feet for weapons. As found by the trial court, police acted entirely 
reasonably in so doing: 
The nub of this case falls on whether or not [Officer Billings] was 
justified in picking up that coat and checking it for weapons. . . . We expect 
officers to act reasonably and we, we consider whether or not they [are] 
reasonable by looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only 
imagine [] Barney Fife conducting a search, making sure the man had no 
weapons, and then turning around and handing him the weapon. How 
dumb is that. If, if there's a reason to make certain that the man has no 
weapon and to remove him from danger, and then immediately as a matter 
of courtesy hand him a coat[,] but not check it for weapons that's, that's 
ludicrous. 
And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the coat, because of the 
totality of the circumstances was so closely related in time that it was 
reasonably related to removing [defendant] from the room, and that it was 
practically and reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure 
that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting the Terry frisk. 
(R210:52). At trial counsel's request, the trial court clarified that defendant had not 
requested the coat and that he (the trial court) found the search of the coat to fall within 
the parameters of Terry: "[I]t's a reasonable check for weapons before he hands him the 
coat due to the fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is there, it's his coat[] 
(R210:54).4 
Other courts to consider the scope of a Terry frisk, including the United States 
Supreme Court, have ruled similarly, rejecting defendants' claims that a Terry pat-down 
is limited to a frisk of the suspect's outer clothing. See e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1047 (1983) (authorizing weapons frisk of vehicle passenger compartment); Servis 
4Neither party took up the trial court's invitation to prepare written findings (see 
R210:54). 
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v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156, 160-161 (Va. App. 1988) (collecting cases and 
observing that "Supreme Court, lower and federal court, and state court cases since Terry 
have extended the scope of a frisk beyond the suspect's outer clothing"); Jordan v. State, 
531 A.2d 1028, 1031-1032 (Md. App. 1987) (same); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822, 828 
(Haw. 1984) (citing Long and recognizing that "there [was] no question" search of 
suspect's knapsack "was valid under the Fourth Amendment and reaching same result 
under state constitution). See also United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534-535 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (analogizing to search incident-to-arrest doctrine in upholding weapons search 
of duffel bag). Indeed, Long expressly clarified that "Terry need not be read as restricting 
the preventative search to the person of the detained suspect." 463 U.S. at 1047. This 
clarification is consistent with Utah courts' long recognition "that it is 'essential that law 
officers should have reasonable liberty to investigate crimes without undue impediment or 
restriction.'" State v. Belgard, 840 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. 
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)). Accord Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 
(6th Cir. 1992) ("We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination 
to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What 
constitutes 'reasonable' action may seem quite different to someone facing a possible 
assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure"). 
As noted above, Long authorizes police to conduct a protective Terry-type search 
of a passenger compartment of a vehicle during a traffic stop: 
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to 
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if 
9 
the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant' the officers in believing that the suspect is 
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control weapons. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1049. Accord State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983-984 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing Long and recognizing that "if a police officer has specific articulable facts 
which reasonably warrant the officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and may 
gain immediate control of weapons, the officer can search the suspect and those nearby 
areas where a weapon may be hidden" (emphasis in original)). In so ruling, the Supreme 
Court recognized that its "past cases indicate [] that protection of police and others can 
justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a 
danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, 
and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding 
a suspect." Id. at 1049. According to the Supreme Court the issue is simply "'whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger.'" Id. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
While the instant facts do not involve an inherently dangerous roadside encounter 
as in Long and Strickling, that is not a sufficient ground upon which to distinguish the 
result here—a situation equally fraught with danger. As found by the trial court, both 
Officer Billings and Dawn were frightened by defendant's sudden emergence from a 
closet in a dark bedroom where Dawn's baby was sleeping (see R210:48-50, 52). While 
defendant was apparently the boyfriend of Dawn's mother, his presence in the bedroom 
was unauthorized, unwanted, threatening and potentially dangerous (id.). Officer 
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Billings's experience that welfare checks based on alleged drug use are frequently 
dangerous (see R210:47), was borne out here by defendant's suspicious and alarming bolt 
from the closet. Cf. State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55 (noting the 
"combustible nature of domestic disputes"), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
Moreover, the instant weapons search was less intrusive than those upheld in Terry 
or in Long. It was less personally invasive than a traditional Terry pat-down because 
defendant was not wearing his jacket or shoes at the time. See State v. Schultz, 491 
N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ohio App. 1985) (observing that search of an unworn coat "[was] a 
significantly less intrusive official act than a search of the person or a Terry-type pat-
down"). It was also less expansive than the passenger compartment search authorized in 
Long because police only checked the two specific items of clothing defendant had 
apparently just discarded, and which he was standing on or near at the time he frightened 
Officer Billings and Dawn in bolting from the closet (see R210:51). Given these facts, 
the trial court reasonably determined that checking defendant's coat and shoes for 
weapons were properly part of a justified Terry frisk (see R210:52). 
Notwithstanding, defendant makes much of the fact that he had been escorted from 
Dawn's bedroom when less than 60 seconds later (see R210:50), Officer Billings checked 
his discarded jacket for weapons. Aplt. Br. at 9. However, "'[t]he fact that the protection 
of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by "less intrusive" means 
does not by itself, render the search unreasonable.'" United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 686-687 (1985) (quoting Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)). 
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Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court and this Court have previously rejected 
similar challenges to Terry-type weapons searches, albeit in traffic-stop scenarios. Long 
specifically recognizes that a suspect might "break away from police control and retrieve 
a weapon from his automobile." 463 U.S. at 1051. See also Strickling, 844 P.2d at 984-
985 (recognizing that "weapons hidden in the passenger compartment of a car might still 
be a danger even when the occupants have been temporarily detained outside the car"); 
State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that "the fact, taken 
in isolation, that a suspect is outside a vehicle while an officer is conducting a search does 
not overcome an officer's reasonable fear because the suspect may 'break away from 
police control and retrieve a weapon from the [the] automobile'" (quoting Long, 463 U.S. 
at 1051)). 
The same safety rational applies to these facts, as it was just as likely that 
defendant could break away from his police escort and retrieve his jacket or shoes. Cf 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-785 (Utah App. 1991 (holding that diaper bag 
approximately ten feet away was "sufficiently within the Harrisons' immediate control, as 
that term has been construed to permit its search incident to their arrest"). But Cf State v. 
Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that cocaine found in lining of Wells' 
jacket was not sufficiently within his control for purposes of a valid search incident-to-
arrest because, inter alia, the jacket may have been in a different room than that where 
Wells was arrested, and there was no evidence of any officer safety concern as to the 
jacket). 
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Perhaps more importantly, Officer Billings's intended to give the jacket and shoes 
to the lightly dressed and barefoot defendant while he was detained outside in "extremely 
cold" December weather (see R210:15, 52). The safety concerns that allow police to 
check a vehicle passenger compartment for weapons before allowing the suspect to 
reenter surely allow an officer to check a suspect's discarded coat and shoes before 
returning the same. See State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520, 523 (Ariz. 1991) (observing that 
officer acted prudently in patting down suspect's jacket for weapons before handing it to 
defendant, albeit at defendant's request); People v. Bowles, 289 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (1968) 
(upholding frisk of unworn pants on floor near bed where defendant was discovered 
noting that "[i]t would have been perilous to permit the suspect to put his trousers on and 
thus permit him access to a dangerous weapon"), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969). See 
also 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, §9.5(e), p. 284 (3rd ed. 1996) (recognizing that 
"there may exist circumstances in which the officer might 'reasonably suspect the 
possibility of harm if he returns [property] unexamined' and that in such circumstances 
the officer must be allowed to 'inspect the interior of the item before returning it'") 
(quoting Model Rules for Law Enforcement, Stop and Frisk, rule 605 (1974)). Indeed, 
whether defendant was ultimately arrested or released, and regardless whether he 
requested his coat and shoes, reason, if not common courtesy, demanded that defendant 
have access to his coat and shoes at some point during the investigative detention. Given 
defendant's undisputedly alarming behavior police were wholly justified in first 
determining that neither item contained a weapon. Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (observing 
13 
that investigations like that in Terry and Long "involve[] a police investigation 'at close 
range,' when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial 
arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a 'quick decision as to how to 
protect himself and others form possible danger'") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28). 
Nevertheless, defendant suggests that no safety issue existed here "unless-or 
until-the coat was taken by the officers to [him]." Aplt. Br. At 10. If defendant is 
suggesting that the coat and shoes were not properly returned to him because he 
deliberately left them behind, he arguably lacks standing to contest their search. See, e.g., 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that officers may seize 
contraband a fleeing suspect discards during flight because the suspect has abandoned the 
contraband). See also United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1117 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that defendants lacked standing to challenge seizure of contraband because it 
was seized after they threw it into the ocean); United States v. Edwards, 644 F.2d 1, 2 (5th 
Cir.) (per curiam) (recognizing abandonment where a defendant has "voluntarily 
discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property question"), 
cert denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981). 
Defendant's further cursory assertions that "there was nothing about the coat or the 
surrounding circumstances that caused Officer Billings to believe that there might be a 
weapon" therein, and that the officer did not suspect that defendant had committed a drug 
crime, are respectively unsupported and ultimately irrelevant. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. Trial 
counsel elicited the officer's negative response to his question whether "there was 
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anything about the coat or about the circumstances there that led [the officer] to believe 
there might be a weapon in the coat" (R210:20), but the officer's response must be 
viewed in the context of his entire testimony. While Officer Billings agreed that there 
was nothing patently dangerous about the coat, he was also concerned for his and others' 
safety based on the totality of the circumstances, particularly defendant's startling and 
suspicious emergence from the bedroom closet (see R210:51-52). Accordingly, as any 
prudent officer would, given similar circumstances, Officer Billings reasonably and 
justifiably checked defendant's coat for any hidden and dangerous weapons before 
handing it to him. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1136-1137 (recognizing that subjective focus 
on officer's state of mind is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment law: "Thus, the fact that 
the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which 
provided the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken, 
as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action"); Bradford, 839 P.2d 
at 871 ("The proper standard is objective, requiring only that a reasonably prudent person 
in the police officer's circumstances would believe his or her safety was threatened"). As 
for the officer's suspicions of a drug crime, or lack thereof, given that the instant frisk 
was eminently justified by an obvious safety concern, it is irrelevant whether the officer 
also suspected defendant of a drug crime—an arguably reasonable suspicion on these 
facts. 
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court never ruled on the validity of the 
search of his shoes. Aplt. Br. at 8 n.5. While the trial court did not make a specific 
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finding in that regard, the trial court made findings regarding the propriety of the frisk 
including defendant's jacket and clearly viewed police conduct in frisking defendant and 
his nearby clothing as part of a justified Terry frisk (see R210:52). See State v. Ramirez, 
814 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that the appellate court will "uphold[] the 
trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings"). Cf. American Fork v. 
Singleton, 2002 UT app 331, ffif 2, 9-10, 57 P.3d 1124 (remanding for entry of findings 
where trial court wholly failed to enter any findings in support of its conclusion that the 
motion to suppress should be denied).5 
Based on the above, the jacket and shoes at issue here were closely identified with 
defendant's person and the trial court correctly determined that they fell within the scope 
of a permissible Terry frisk. This Court should therefore affirm the denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. In the alternative, if the Court finds that the coat and shoes were not 
properly associated with defendant, the Court should find that defendant abandoned these 
items and he therefore lacks standing to contest their search. 
5
 Although not addressed by the trial court, there is an additional justification for 
the search of defendant's shoes on these facts—Officer Billings found the 
methamphetamine-loaded syringe in defendant's coat before the syringes in defendant's 
shoes were found (see R28-27, 205:21). Accordingly, probable cause to arrest preceded 
the actual search of defendant's shoes. See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-1112 ("A 
search is not invalid despite the fact that it precedes a formal arrest, so long as the arrest 
and search are substantially contemporaneous and probable cause to effect the arrest 
exists independent of the evidence seized in the search"), cert, denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1989). Therefore, the trial court's ruling, vis-a-vis defendant's shoes, may be affirmed on 
this additional ground. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f f 10-13, 52 P.3d 1158 ("[A]n 
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record.") (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's sound ruling, that police properly checked defendant's person, 
coat and shoes for weapons, should be upheld. 
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He's still securing the area, it's still a Terry frisk. 
And the state would ask that you rule that way, 
Your Honor. Thank you. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
Well, these are interesting facts and I think I 
need to, I need to make some factual findings before I rule 
on the law. 
As I see the evidence and as I understand the 
evidence this is, this is how I find it for the purposes of 
this hearing. The officers had a report of, and I can only 
take it as anonymous because it was never described, it was 
apparently dispatched so we don't know where the report came 
from. But the information they were given was that there was 
meth, methamphetamine possibly being used by injection, but 
at least being used in front of children in the apartment, 
and that they were going to the apartment for the purpose of 
determining if children were in danger because of meth use in 
their presence. 
The officer testified from his experience that when 
there is suspected drug use in a residence or in a situation 
like that that there's a heightened amount of danger, that he 
goes into it with a, a raised level of apprehension and 
concern. 
He knocked on the door. It was answered by an 
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older lady and then who was soon joined by a younger lady who 
was apparently the tenant of the home, she testified at the 
preliminary hearing. 
The officer entered the apartment, walked through 
the apartment, up some stairs, down a hall, around a turn, 
down a hall, and into a bedroom. It was a back bedroom, it 
was, there was a baby in the bedroom in the crib. The room 
was unusually dark, darker than just from turning off the 
lights, the shades were drawn and there were additional 
blankets or sheets or something put up to make the room 
darker than normal. The mother stepped into the room to 
attend to the baby. It had been explained to the mother that 
the concern was whether or not drugs had been used in the 
room. The officer followed the mother into the room several 
feet, several steps, I don't recall which. But he had 
clearly entered the room, had not at that point noticed the 
defendant, had been there for a couple of seconds, briefly 
entered the room. 
At that point the defendant came from the closet. 
The closet, as I understand it the doors were not closed but 
the defendant had not been seen. Whether because of the way 
he was positioned in the closet or because it was dark, it 
wasn't made clear, but he hadn't been noticed. He came from 
the area of the closet quickly. 
The mother was surprised. Her testimony was, and 
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I'm looking at page 33 of the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing, page 33 line 14, the question was... Well, starting 
at line 11. Well starting at the beginning of the page. 
The question was: 
Q. "Were you in the room when Mr. Peterson 
came from out of the closet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did that surprise you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. I thought he was still in the kitchen 
with my mother. 
Q. Where was he when the officers arrived? 
A. In the kitchen. 
Q. He was in the kitchen? Do you know what 
he had, did you know that he had then 
gone and hid in the closet? 
A. No, I didn't know where he went. 
Q. When you saw him go out of the closet 
what did you exclaim? 
A. I screaming out my mother and"... 
And I said, "I'm sorry"? 
The witness said: 
A. "! I screaming out my mom and asked her 
why her boyfriend was in my room." 
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So the mother was startled, was surprised and was 
concerned that he had somehow gotten to the, gotten to the 
room. So she was frightened. The officer was frightened, 
a sudden movement. 
What happened next is that the officer stopped him, 
put up his hands, whether he spoke to him or whether he 
physically stopped him, he stopped him, turned him around, he 
did a frisk and had him removed from the room. And then 
within 60 seconds later, I think at the outside it was 
within, within a minute, within 60 seconds or a little less 
he, he sees the coat. He says is this his coat? And a seven 
year old child, a girl says yes, that's his coat. And he 
feels the coat, feels the syringe, and then took the coat out 
to him and found that he had been taken out to the front 
porch. Those are the facts as I understand them. 
I'm, I'm really uncomfortable applying the arrest 
and search doctrine in cases. Those, those cases, Chimmel 
(phonetic) was an automobile stop, and most of those cases 
arise from stops on the freeway or stops of vehicles. And, 
and it's very plain that the court is making a bright line so 
that officers don't have to make those judgment calls, can I 
search, can I not search. We don't want them, for instance, 
taking a defendant out of a car and making him stand by the 
side of the road to justify their search, when it would be 
simply safer to put him in the patrol car and secure the 
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situation before you do a search. 
And in any one of those cases that I'm familiar 
with, a Terry frisk of his car is, is really a stretch. 
Usually what it is is that the officer would have the right 
to search the car, they have some probable cause, they have 
some suspicion that justifies a search of the car if the 
defendant is there. And the courts have said you don't have 
to leave him there because that's dumb and it's not safe by 
the side of the road. And there are all these circumstances 
that have to do with automobiles and roadways for officer 
safety. None of them apply. This is a house. 
The question for me and the totality of the 
circumstances, the initial frisk was justified, that's the 
first question. And I find that it was. We've got a 
heightened, a heightened concern because of potential drug 
use, we've got a baby in the room, we've got a darkened room, 
we've got a person who is by all accounts surprisingly in the 
room, certainly to the mother, to the officer, who bolts out, 
comes quickly. The officer is justified in that totality of 
circumstances being concerned about his person. And 
stopping the defendant, conducting a Terry frisk and removing 
him from the room is completely consistent with the totality 
of the circumstances as I see it. He was there to remove 
potential drug use from babies. And, and while he hasn't, 
he doesn't, doesn't have proof of drug use he has a situation 
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that's a concern to the mother, obviously, she didn't expect 
this man to be in the room. And, and we've got a sudden 
movement. The Terry frisk and the action to protect his 
security is absolutely justified. Remove him from the 
room. 
The nub of this case falls on whether or not he was 
justified in picking up that coat and checking it for 
weapons. We don't... We expect officers to act reasonably 
and we, we consider whether or not they're reasonable by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only 
imagine (short inaudible) Barney Fife conducting a search, 
making sure the man had no weapons, and then turning around 
and handing him the weapon. How dumb is that. If, if 
there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon 
and to remove him from danger, and then immediately as a 
matter of courtesy hand him a coat but not check it for 
weapons that's, that's ludicrous. 
And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the 
coat because of the totality of these circumstances was so 
closely related in time that it was reasonably related to 
removing him from the room, and that it was practically and 
reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure 
that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting 
the Terry frisk. 
Therefore, I deny the motion. 
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MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor may I, may I make two 
additional points? 
THE JUDGE: No. I've ruled. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: May I point you to another case? 
THE JUDGE: Save it for the court of appeals. 
You've made your argument, I've ruled. The motion is 
denied. 
MR. EASTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: If you wish to prepare findings I'll 
be happy to consider them. But I'm, I'm not going to 
consider additional argument, Counsel. I've ruled. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, I'd like to point the case, to 
the State vs. Beavers which indicates— 
THE JUDGE: Well— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: —that if there's an exigency— 
THE JUDGE: Counsel— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Created by the police that— 
THE JUDGE: Counsel, I have ruled. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. Now I would, I would make an 
additional motion, Your Honor, for the Court to reconsider 
its ruling based on State vs. Beavers, and I've got that case 
here if you need it. 
THE JUDGE: I'm very familiar with State vs. 
Beavers. That wasn't a (inaudible word) search, and I 
understand the circumstances of the case. But in my view the 
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totality of the circumstances there and here are different. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: And may I, may I ask so the ruling 
of the Court is that the search of the coat falls under the 
Terry frisk doctrine? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. That it's, it's a reasonable 
check for weapons before he hands him the coat due to the 
fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is 
there, it's his coat, he removes the coat with the— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: May I ask the Court to make an 
amendment to their findings that, and I think it's supported 
by the state, by the testimony of Officer Billings, that 
Mr. Peterson never asked for the coat? 
MR. EASTON: I think that's in the record, Your 
Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's in the record. What I will 
tell you to do because I know that this is a potential basis 
for appeal, it's critical to the case, either of you or both 
of you prepare findings. If you can come to an agreement on 
the findings or one of you wants to prepare them and submit 
them, I'll be happy to look at the findings and sign them so 
you can have your complete record. I think you understand 
it. 
We're set for trial next Monday. Are there other 
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issues we can or need to address before the trial? 
MR. EASTON: I believe in our conference call the 
other day it was unclear based after the determination of 
this motion whether it would still be a jury trial. 
THE JUDGE: It is unless somebody asks me to waive 
the jury or asks to waive the jury and— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor, if I could have a few 
minutes to talk with Mr. Easton— 
THE JUDGE: Certainly. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: — and my client Mr. Peterson, we 
might have some work to do on that. 
THE JUDGE: We'll take a short recess for five 
minutes or so. Let me know if you need to come back. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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